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TRANSNATIONAL/DOMESTIC
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Mark Tushnet*
I. A PERSONAL INTRODUCTION
My training was in U.S. constitutional law, but constitutional
developments around the world led me to take an interest in the
domestic constitutional law of other nations.2 One cannot study that
subject without noticing that some of the world's constitutional
courts pay attention to U.S. constitutional law.3 For awhile, U.S.
constitutionalists could treat this phenomenon under the heading,
"the influence of the United States Constitution abroad. '  A broader
historical perspective would have yielded the insight that, at least in
the past, the U.S. Supreme Court paid attention to at least some
aspects of foreign constitutional law, sometimes referring to the
traditions of the Anglo-Saxon people in a way that would seem
rather ethnocentric today.5
Even a scholar who focuses on contemporary U.S. constitutional
law must now think about the constitutional law of other nations, as
the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to refer to constitutional (or para-
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown
University Law Center. I would like to thank John Echeverria, David Fontana,
and Allan Ides for helpful comments on earlier version of this Essay.
2. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND
AMERICA (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999).
3. For a discussion of some of the relevant cases, see Kim Lane
Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for
Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 296, 304-07 (2003).
4. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal
eds., 1990).
5. For a discussion, see Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and
Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on
"Proportionality, " Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583 (1999).
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constitutional) developments elsewhere. 6 But, as I have discovered,
the discourse about some aspects of such developments can strike a
domestic U.S. constitutional lawyer as quite strange. I understand-
sometimes with some work, of course-the concepts and approaches
in some of the constitutional systems I have started to explore. For
example, I could see constitutionalists in France and Germany
struggling over how to accommodate the formalism they brought
from their study of non-constitutional law to the realism that they
deemed necessary to understand constitutional law. They did not use
the terms I would have used, but at least I could translate these
discussions into categories that made sense to me from my own
domestic U.S. constitutional perspective.
However, some of what I read by the international lawyers (or
the domestic constitutional lawyers who had completely assimilated
the discourse of international law) left me quite baffled. If learning
the domestic constitutional law of other nations was like learning a
foreign language, learning what the international lawyers were
talking about seemed to me like trying to learn what space-aliens
were saying. Their concerns appear completely unconnected to the
things I worry about as a domestic U.S. constitutionalist, and yet they
seemed to think that these concerns mattered a lot for domestic
constitutional law.
This Essay is my effort to make sense-to myself, if to no one
else-of my experience with the discourse of international lawyers.
Part II describes recent references in U.S. Supreme Court opinions to
constitutional developments in other jurisdictions, and the critiques
of those references from within the Court. I also offer my comments
as a domestic U.S. constitutionalist on the disagreements among the
justices. Part III broadens the focus to outline areas in which U.S.
law clearly incorporates non-U.S. law as a rule of decision, or in
which a significant group of scholars argues that U.S. law should be
interpreted to do so. I sketch some of the challenges scholars have
made to these decisions and arguments, focusing primarily on what I
6. See infra Part U. By para-constitutional law, I mean the human rights
jurisprudence of transnational bodies that have themselves influenced domestic
constitutional law, both in the nations directly involved in the creation of those
bodies and in other nations. For a discussion, see Gerald L. Neuman, Human
Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1863, 1873-80(2003).
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call "discrete" constitutional challenges to particular ways in which
non-U.S. law might become a rule of decision.
Part IV broadens the focus further. There I try to get a handle
on the concerns underlying the specific challenges described in Part
III. These are what I call sovereignty-based concerns, that is,
suggestions that making non-U.S. law a rule of decision somehow
impairs U.S. sovereignty. It is at this point that I find myself lost,
and the discourses of international law and domestic constitutional
law seem to get disconnected. My conclusion is that the people
raising challenges to references to, and incorporation of, non-U.S.
law in U.S. constitutional law are worried about something, but not
about what they say they are. The important analytical concerns are
not about sovereignty but are rather about the substance of domestic
constitutional law, and about the separation of powers question of
who gets to determine that substance. And, the animating concern is
that the people who would determine the substance of constitutional
law, should non-U.S. law become routinely incorporated into U.S.
law, are "domestic" elites with views that differ from the critics'.
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
OTHER NATIONS: RECENT OPINIONS
Prior to Lawrence v. Texas,7 no recent Supreme Court decision
relied on non-U.S. constitutional or para-constitutional law to
support a proposition that was material to the majority's analysis. In
Printz v. United States,8 Justice Breyer argued that the German
system of federalism, which requires that the national government
administer its law by using state-level officials, demonstrated that
federalism as such did not necessitate the majority's anti-
commandeering principle.9 Justice Scalia responded for the majority
that the considerations Justice Breyer mentioned might be relevant to
designing a constitution's arrangements but were irrelevant to
interpreting the actual Constitution of the United States.'0 As I have
argued elsewhere, the real disagreement between Justice Breyer and
Justice Scalia was not about the relevance of non-U.S. law to
constitutional interpretation in general, as Justice Scalia's response
7. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
8. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
9. Id. at 976-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
10. Id. at921 n.ll.
242 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:239
suggested, but was rather about the proper approach to interpreting
the U.S. Constitution." Justice Scalia, pursuing an originalist
approach, finds non-U.S. law relevant only when-as he thinks
rare-the Framers knew that the terms they were using were
understood to refer to non-U.S. law.'2  Justice Breyer, pursuing a
functionalist interpretation, believes that non-U.S. law is relevant
when it can inform the Court's assessment of the practical workings
of alternative institutional arrangements.13
Justice Breyer has referred to non-U.S. constitutional law for
another purpose, although still within a generally functionalist
framework. Dissenting from the denial of review in a case raising
the question of whether it becomes unconstitutional to execute a
person if his detention prior to execution is so extended as to itself
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Breyer pointed to
decisions from non-U.S. tribunals finding that this so-called "death
row phenomenon" is indeed an impermissible form of punishment.
14
Justice Breyer indicated that these judgments should inform the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 15 There
is, however, an additional consideration. Soering v. United
Kingdom16 holds that it violates the European Convention on Human
Rights to extradite a person charged with a crime to a nation where
the death row phenomenon occurs. 17 The U.S. Supreme Court's
unwillingness to find the death row phenomenon unconstitutional
thus may interfere with the smooth administration of justice within
the United States.'
8
11. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,
108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1232-33 (1999).
12. An example would be U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (referring to the
"Law of Nations").
13. Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-78.
14. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992-93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
see also Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944-45 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari, discussing how foreign courts refuse to
extradite capital defendants to America for fear of undue delay in execution).
15. Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944-45.
16. 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 439 (1989).
17. Id.
18. One response to Justice Breyer's concern about punishing criminals is
that the U.S. Supreme Court's position protects federalism without interfering
with the administration of justice. The Court's position leaves it up to the
states where the death row phenomenon occurs to choose whether they would
rather forgo punishment altogether, or obtain control of the defendant by
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Another death penalty case suggests how reference to non-U.S.
law might be consistent even with originalist premises. Atkins v.
Virginia19 held that it was unconstitutional to subject persons with
mental retardation to the risk of capital punishment.20 In a footnote,
the Court observed that, "within the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.' This simple
factual observation provoked one of Justice Scalia's most sarcastic
responses, although he did not deny its factual accuracy. Scalia
awarded "the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate
'national consensus' . . . to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a
footnote) to the views of. . . the so-called 'world community."'
22
The sarcasm was plainly out of place; the majority did not in any
way rely on the world community's views to show a domestic
consensus about the question at issue, but merely noted a fact about
the prevalence of a particular judgment in other nations.23
Justice Scalia was responding to arguments urged to the Court
by advocates, and sometimes in dissenting opinions, rather than to
any argument the Atkins majority actually made. In response to the
argument that international law condemned subjecting juvenile
offenders to the risk of capital punishment, the Court, speaking
through Justice Scalia, rejected the relevance of non-U.S. law to
interpreting the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.24 Even if that ban were to be interpreted in light of
contemporary notions of decent treatment, Justice Scalia wrote, the
relevant notions were those of the people of the United States.25
promising not to seek the death penalty in his case (as occurred in the
aftermath of Soering). See Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944. Yet, the decision is not
entirely the state's. The state must call upon the national government, through
the Secretary of State, to provide the guarantee that the person for whom
extradition is sought will not be subject to the possibility of capital
punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court's position, seen in federalist terms,
complicates the national government's foreign relations.
19. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
20. Id. at 321.
21. Id. at 317 n.21 (citing Brief for European Union as amicus curiae 4).
22. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 317 n.21.
24. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989).
25. Id.
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One might question that conclusion even on originalist premises,
although I personally would not do so and have not done the research
to support the suggestion that follows. The argument would begin
with the Declaration of Independence, which stated that "a decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind ' 26 required the Declaration's
signers to explain the reasons for their action.27 The audience for the
Declaration was international as well as domestic. Of course, the
Declaration's authors needed to gain the world's sympathy if the
revolution was to succeed. Nonetheless, the assumption that
foundational documents had audiences beyond the domestic ones
may well have pervaded the intellectual universe of the late
eighteenth century and may have been made by the Constitution's
framers. It seems to be accepted that the Framers understood that the
term cruel in the Eighth Amendment would shift with the changing
notions of cruelty and that the Amendment would ban cruel
punishments as cruelty was understood when the punishments were
sought to be administered. To the extent that today's Americans
continue to have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind,
reference to non-U.S. law to inform the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment might be justified on originalist grounds.
The current Court's first use of non-U.S. law to support a
position relevant to its disposition came in Lawrence v. Texas,28 the
2003 decision invalidating laws making consensual sodomy a
293crime.z 9  Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,3° the 1986
decision where Chief Justice Burger contended that governments
had regulated homosexual conduct "throughout the history of
Western civilization," and that "[c]ondemnation of those practices is
firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards."
31
26. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
27. But see JEREMY RABKrN, WHY SOvEREIGNTY MATTERS 10 (1998)
(mentioning this phrase but observing that its authors did not "seek
international permission for American independence").
28. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
29. Id. at 2484. But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734
(1997) (relying on experience in the Netherlands with the administration of a
law authorizing assisted suicide to illustrate difficulties in ensuring that
practices of euthanasia do not develop under such statutes).
30. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472,
2484 (2003).
31. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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Echoes of Justice Burger's position could be heard in the majority
opinion as well. 32 Rebutting these claims, Justice Kennedy's opinion
in Lawrence referred to a major decision of the European Court of
Human Rights, rendered in 1981, holding that bans on consensual
homosexual conduct were violations of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. 33 Justice
Kennedy used that decision to show that the claim made by the
defendants in Lawrence was hardly "insubstantial in our Western
civilization."
34
These cases show that references to non-U.S. constitutional law
have become more frequent in recent years than they had been in
decades from 1960 to 1990. 35 They also show that there is some
controversy over the relevance of such references to the
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. It is important not to
exaggerate the degree of controversy manifested on the Supreme
Court. Four Justices-Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer-
have adverted to non-U.S. law in their opinions, while three-
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas-have written opinions expressly
criticizing references to non-U.S. law.36  The next step toward
understanding the sources of the controversy involves expanding the
32. See id. at 192-96.
33. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)).
34. Id. Scalia called this discussion "meaningless dicta," id. at 2495, but
that seems wrong. Kennedy invoked non-U.S. law to rebut one of the
contentions made in defense of the proposition that the U.S. Constitution did
not bar states from making consensual sodomy a crime. Id. at 2481.
35. In addition to the cases described in the text, there is Justice Ginsburg's
concurring opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347-48 (2003).
There, the majority stated that affirmative action programs had to have a
foreseeable termination point and suggested that there would be no need for
them in twenty-five years. Id. at 2346-47. Justice Ginsburg noted that these
suggestions "accord[] with the international understanding of the office of
affirmative action," citing the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Id. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
36. Two of Scalia's opinions, in Stanford and Printz, were for the Court, so
to some extent his criticisms can be attributed to the other Justices who joined
those opinions. Yet, two of the opinions referring to non-U.S. constitutional
law, Lawrence and Atkins, were also for the Court. Under these circumstances,
I think it best to attribute the references to the individual Justices who wrote
the opinions rather than to the Court as a corporate entity.
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scope of our view to examine other areas in which non-U.S. law is
incorporated into U.S. law as a rule of decision (or in which
respected commentators urge that it should be so incorporated). I
will then outline the challenges that have been raised to these
developments, aiming to dispel my sense that there is something
quite odd about what seems to drive the challenges.
III. NoN-U.S. LAW AS A RULE OF DECISION
The question of using non-U.S. law as a rule of decision under
domestic U.S. law has arisen in three important areas.
37
The first involves the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA").38 The
ATCA provides that the federal district courts "shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
39
For several decades, since the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,40 the lower federal
courts have routinely relied on non-U.S. law to determine whether an
alleged tort violates the law of nations.41 The courts construed the
ATCA to create a cause of action for torts that violated evolving
understandings of international law.42
The earliest cases involved torture and similar gross violations
of human rights.43 That remains true today of most of the relatively
small number of cases invoking the ATCA, but representatives of the
anti-globalization movement have begun to file claims under the
37. I put aside as entirely uncontroversial the traditional use of non-U.S.
law as a rule of decision in cases where choice of law principles direct a U.S.
court to rely on non-U.S. law as a rule of decision (although I will suggest later
that the reason for the lack of controversy over such consequences of choice of
law principles helps explain why the controversy over the areas I do discuss is
badly framed).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). I have discovered that there is a bizarre-and
to me totally pointless-controversy over how to refer to this statute.
Apparently, human rights advocates call it the Alien Tort Claims Act, while
their opponents call it the Alien Tort Act. That people actually think anything
turns on the label shows how odd these discussions are.
39. Id.
40. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
41. See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).
42. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
43. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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ATCA challenging the routine employment practices of transnational
corporations.44 This new use of the ATCA has in turn made it
controversial.4a
Critics of the expanded use of the ATCA would construe it more
narrowly than has become settled. They suggest that the ATCA
should at most be treated as creating a cause of action for torts that
were violations of international law as of the late eighteenth century
when the statute was enacted.46 With respect to other torts that are
violations of modem international law, the ATCA is merely
jurisdictional and does not create a cause of action.47 Rather, the
cause of action must be found in some other law. That other law
could be federal law found elsewhere in the United States Code, but
the primary candidate for the source of the cause of action is state
law.
48
This bifurcated construction has the advantage of preserving the
ATCA as it has been invoked in the least controversial cases, those
involving torture. It has the disadvantage, for me at least, of
generating arguments that seem metaphysical. Consider a claim
alleging a tort that violates "modem" international law. Presumably
a federal court faced with such a claim would first have to identify
some specific state with which the litigation has contact. 49 It would
then have to ask whether that state's law makes it a tort to violate
international law in the way alleged. Of course, that question almost
44. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628,
00-57195 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), reh'g en
banc granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003).
45. The Bush Administration urged the Ninth Circuit to restrict the
interpretation of the ATCA to cases involving violations of diplomatic
immunity. See Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Alien Tort Claims Act,
230 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2003).
46. Cf RABKIN, supra note 27, at 24,50-56 (describing the limited scope of
traditional customary international law and its recent expansion).
47. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 587, 591 (2002) (arguing that the statute should be interpreted as
implementing the alienage diversity jurisdiction).
48. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REv. 816, 870 (1997). Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents allowed a cause
of action based on the U.S. Constitution to proceed where the only applicable
statute was one simply conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts. 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
49. This is to ensure the satisfaction of due process concerns.
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certainly has never arisen in the state courts, in part because of the
prevailing interpretation of the ATCA. Accordingly, the federal
court would have to ask itself the Erie-analog: Would the state
courts, if asked, find that state law creates a cause of action for torts
that violate international law? 50 My guess is that any federal court
inclined to impose liability under the ATCA would find that the state
courts would do so as well. In the end, the difference between the
prevailing interpretation of the ATCA and the proffered alternative is
that under the prevailing interpretation, Congress can displace the
cause of action while under the alternative state legislatures could.
The phrase "tempest in a teapot" seems to me to have been
invented for controversies like this. 5' Something else must be going
on. The real concern, I think, is that under both the prevailing and
the alternative understanding, federal judges' decisions will control
the outcome in practice. 52  The apparent concern for federalism
conceals the real concern for judicial power.
I have the same reaction to the second area of controversy,
which involves whether customary international law is part of the
"Laws of the United States" under the Supremacy Clause. 53 Many
early Supreme Court opinions say that it is, although ordinarily as
dictum. And, of course, treaties are supreme under the Supremacy
Clause. 4 International law does not distinguish between customary
international law and treaty-based law on the question of whether
each is law; both are. So, if as a matter of international law, treaty-
based law and customary international law are equally law, why
should they not be equally law for purposes of the Supremacy
Clause?
55
Critics of the view that customary international law is law for
purposes of the Supremacy Clause do not deny that it is law. Rather,
50. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
51. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 870 (observing that the
consequences of adopting their view would not be dire). The effects would be
in the handful of cases-none reaching a contested judgment on the merits-in
which claims of human rights violations have been made.
52. See id. at 856 (directing inquiry at the existence of authorization to the
federal courts); id. at 869 (seeking "inquiry into political branch intent").
53. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
54. Id.
55. One possibility is that the Supremacy Clause specifically mentions
treaties but does not refer directly to customary international law.
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they assert, it is law, just not law of the United States.5 6 Customary
international law is the law of New York, Iowa, and Texas.57 To
anyone outside the discourse (and apparently to many inside it),
58
this is so odd as to be nearly unintelligible.
But, again, there is something else going on. If customary
international law is the law of New York, Iowa, and Texas, law-
makers in New York, Iowa, and Texas can decide what the content
of that law is. If customary international law is the law of the United
States, in contrast, national law-makers define its content.5 9
Customary international law is made-in the first instance-by the
practice of nations whose decision-makers believe they are under
some legal obligation to behave as they do, supported by the
judgments of international lawyers who confirm that the obligation
exists (opinio juris, as I have come to know).6° However, nations
can relieve themselves of the obligation to comply with customary
international law by objecting to it, at least if the objection is
"persistent," to use the doctrinal term.6 1  The final piece of the
picture is that domestic law-making institutions retain the power to
override nearly all international obligations.62 They can withdraw
from a treaty, violate a treaty for purposes of domestic law while
56. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 870.
57. See id.
58. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?,
111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1861 (1998) (arguing against customary international
law as state law).
59. The point would be clear if Congress were to enact a statute making all
customary international law domestically enforceable. Of course, Congress
can make a particular rule of customary international law domestically
enforceable, but that is not what the controversy is about.
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1987).
61. There is a narrow exception, for rules that are so-called jus cogens,
which are defined as "non-derogable" rules, that is, rules to which every nation
is bound no matter how persistently it has objected. The actual number ofjus
cogens rules appears to be quite small, and none of the rules seem to me at all
controversial within U.S. domestic discussions, although advocates urge the
expansion of the jus cogens set to include rules that would be controversial.
But, precisely because of the controversy, the likelihood of the expansion
seems to me-within the terms of international law discourse-quite small at
present.
62. The exception is jus cogens, although even then some domestic
institution-typically a court-has to determine that the jus cogens norm
applies and has legal consequences.
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accepting the consequences of the violation on the international
level, and-most relevant to customary international law but
applicable as well to treaty obligations---can enact a statute
inconsistent with international law that, prior to the statute, was
domestically applicable, thereby displacing the international rule
with a domestic one under the "last in time" principle.
63
Given all this, when would it matter that a norm of customary
international law was federal law or state law? It seems to me that
the following conditions would have to be: (1) the judge (probably a
federal judge, acting under the alienage, diversity, or federal question
jurisdiction) would not find the conduct at issue to violate purely
domestic law;64 (2) the judge would find the conduct to violate
customary international law; and (3) if customary international law is
federal law, Congress would not displace the judge's holding
whereas some state legislatures would. The real-world cases
satisfying these conditions appear to be a nearly empty set.65 Of
course, one could always respond that the set is empty now, but
might begin to get filled in the future. To which the response is, I
think, that it is generally not a good idea to make law out of concern
that pigs might fly.
63. The international lawyers who worry about domestic law do not like the
"last in time" rule. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 853, 878 (1987). Even the critics of "Globalists" do not assert, however,
that there has been any movement in domestic law away from the "last in
time" rule. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (invoking the
"last in time" rule to explain why the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 barred Breard from insisting on a federal fact-finding
hearing that would allow him to establish an alleged prejudicial violation of the
Vienna Convention).
64. In making that decision the judge would not be barred from treating
customary international law as a datum that might inform his or her
interpretation of domestic law.
65. The usual examples involve capital punishment for juvenile offenders
and the "death row phenomenon." My judgment is that the examples satisfy
none of the conditions: neither practice violates a norm of customary
international law (although advocates assert that each does), any judge who
would find that one of the practices does violate such a norm would have no
difficulty finding that the practice violates the U.S. Constitution, and Congress
would rapidly override a judicial decision invoking only customary
international law as a ground for invalidating either practice.
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An even more important point is that the decision-makers who
determine what customary international law requires are national
judges unless the United States, through the executive or legislative
branches, has objected to the claimed custom. 66 This contrasts with
treaty-based law, or so it is said, because judges merely interpret but
do not make treaties.67 The challenge to treating customary
international law as law for purposes of the Supremacy Clause is
framed with the peculiar implication that the specific content of
customary international law should be determined by state-level
decision-makers.
A final area of seeming controversy is the creation of treaty-
based institutions that have the power to determine domestic law.
The examples are the International Court of Justice's interpretation
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the sanctioning mechanism under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The Vienna Convention requires that people arrested by the
authorities of a nation other than their own be informed of their right
to consult a member of their own nation's consulate.68 For many
years local police officials did not know of, and therefore did not
honor, their obligations under the Vienna Convention.69 Anti-death
penalty activists in the United States and abroad seized on the
undisputed fact that state police officers did not comply with the
Vienna Convention in several capital cases involving citizens of
Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico. 70  They sought to use the non-
compliance as a basis for overturning the convictions and death
66. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 820, 842.
67. The formalism of this assertion is apparent. Just as judges must specify
the content of customary international law in particular circumstances, so too
must they specify what the treaty means in particular applications. In any
interesting case under either customary international law or treaty-based law, I
would think, there is no material difference in the judges' role.
68. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, para. l(b), 21 U.S.T. 77 (entered into force
with respect to the United States of America December 24, 1969).
69. See Anthony N. Bishop, The Death Penalty in the United States: An
International Human Rights Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1213-14
(2003).
70. Jehanne E. Henry, Overcoming Federalism in Internationalized Death
Penalty Cases, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 459, 459-60 (2000).
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71sentences. The U.S. courts held that the Vienna Convention did not
confer rights on individuals, and that, even if it did, failure to assert
those rights in a timely manner precluded the federal courts from
72granting habeas corpus on the basis of the treaty violations. I need
not describe the complex course of litigation here. At its conclusion,
the International Court of Justice held that the Vienna Convention
required its signatories to provide effective remedies for violations of
the relevant duty, that those remedies had to include relief from
convictions, and specifically that invoking ordinary rules about when
objections had to be made would make the remedy ineffective.
73
The WTO's dispute resolution mechanism can determine that
U.S. laws-state or federal-violate the general treaty requirements
to which the United States agreed, and can authorize other nations to
impose otherwise impermissible trade restrictions to compensate the
other nations for the U.S. treaty violations. Formally speaking, the
dispute resolution mechanism does not in itself make the WTO's
treaty interpretations controlling in domestic disputes. However, the
retaliatory sanctions, coupled with the reputational costs of being
labeled a violator of treaty obligations, are supposed to have the
effect of "coercing" the United States to adopt the WTO's
interpretations.74
NAFTA creates a cause of action, enforceable in NAFTA
institutions, against the United States for violations of NAFTA's
obligations, whether by the states or the national government.75 In
such a situation, a determination by a NAFTA panel that some state
law violates the treaty is very likely to generate a response by
Congress preempting the state law.76 Mississippi may or may not
71. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998).
72. See e.g., id. at 375.
73. La Grand Case (Germany v. U.S.), June 27, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1069, 1100
(I.C.J. June 27, 2001).
74. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to
International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 71, 96 (2000) (arguing that "an interpretation adopted by three-fourths of
the WTO membership could effectively create a new obligation on a member
state against the will of that member state") (emphasis added).
75. See Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38
TEX. INT'L L.J. 527, 536 (2003).
76. Id.
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have violated the treaty, but people in other states are going to
wonder why they have to pay for Mississippi's actions.77
It is harder than one might think to formulate the precise
constitutional objection to these institutions. After all, the
Constitution says that treaties are the law of the land, supreme over
state law.78 There could be no constitutional objection to a treaty
that in its terms overrides Mississippi law on some ordinary
commercial subject of the sort affected by NAFTA, or even the laws
of all the states on such a subject. Similarly, there could be no
constitutional objection if the terms of the Vienna Convention
required its signatories to provide individuals with effective
remedies.79
The problems with the WTO and NAFTA institutions, and with
the International Court of Justice, are said to derive from the fact that
the treaties use general terms and then create decision-making bodies
that give those terms content in specific cases.80 This is said to place
the content of the law at one remove from the terms to which the
Senate agreed.8' Still, it is hard to see why domestic treaty makers
should be precluded from concluding that the nation's interests are
advanced by acceding to a treaty with general terms whose content is
to be fleshed out later.
The best objection is that such treaties impermissibly delegate
the power to make domestic law to decision makers who lie outside
the law-making institutions of the United States. 2 For example,
77. 1 use Mississippi as my example because its law was placed in question
in the Loewen Group litigation, although in the end the panel declined to find
that the United States was liable for Mississippi's violation of NAFTA
obligations. In re Loewen Group and United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
June 26, 2003.
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
79. See Young, supra note 75, at 540-41 (observing that such a treaty
provision would disrupt the careful compromises between national and state
interests worked out in the federal habeas corpus statute). This would be a
policy-based argument against agreeing to a treaty with a provision of the sort
described in the text, but it is not, at least in Young's formulation, a
constitutional objection to such a provision. (Young's article is an extremely
good short compendium of the concerns expressed in the critical literature.).
80. Id. at 537 (observing that the WTO and NAFTA "constitute institutions
rather than simply establish binding commitments").
81. See Ku, supra note 74, at 98.
82. See id.; Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2003).
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members of dispute resolution panels do not have the guarantees of
tenure provided by Article III, and they certainly are not nominated
by the president and confirmed by the Senate.83 The same is true of
the judges of the International Court of Justice.
There are a number of difficulties with this argument. First, it is
not entirely clear why institutions that give the United States
incentives, even very strong ones, to displace domestic law with a
rule developed in some non-U.S. institution, are actually making
domestic law. It would be Congress that overrides Mississippi's law
after a NAFTA panel determination, not the NAFTA panel itself.
Ernest Young suggests that the existence of the international
obligation as articulated by the supranational institution may
"profoundly change the political dynamics" of domestic response.
84
When Congress considers what to do, Young argues, it must ask "not
just 'Is money more important than trees?,' but rather 'Do you want
the United States to be an international lawbreaker and pariah?'
85
Actually, though, the issue is not rather but also. That is, the
supranational interpretation supplements, but does not completely
displace, the domestic policy discussion. Young is certainly correct
in asserting that "[i]f international law means anything, then the
element of international legal obligation must change the character of
Congress's decision" 8 6-must, that is, as a normative matter. But, it
takes some substantive political analysis of how things actually work
in Congress to establish that the existence of the supranational
interpretation will actually change the political dynamics (in a way
different from what would happen if some interest group asserted, in
the absence of the supranational interpretation, that international
good citizenship means that the United States ought to follow the
interest group's interpretation of the international obligation). There
might be some differences, but I think that saying that they are
"profound" is a rather obvious overstatement.
Second, David Golove suggests that early practice, which can be
taken to indicate the original understanding of the scope of the treaty
83. See Ku, supra note 74, at 95.
84. Young, supra note 75, at 534.
85. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
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power, involved some delegations to mixed decision-making
bodies.
87
Finally, and I think most important, as my framing of Golove's
response suggests, the actual constitutional objection is not to the
delegation of law-making power in a treaty, but to the treaty itself.
That is, the objection is that the President and Senate lack power
under the Constitution to make treaties that delegate law-making
power. Of course, it is true that the treaty power, like all of
Congress's (or, in this instance, the President's and Senate's) powers,
is subject to restraints imposed elsewhere in the Constitution. But, as
Justice Holmes wrote in Missouri v. Holland,8 at least with respect
to some constitutional restrictions, the content of those restrictions
must be determined with reference to the purposes of the treaty
power and the restrictions. 89 Whether federalism restricts the treaty
power in precisely the same way that it restricts the power to regulate
interstate commerce has become mildly controversial.9" In my view
there is very little to support the proposition that the President and
the Senate should be disabled from advancing the nation's interests
by precluding them from trading off some intrusions on the states for
other advantages they regard as more important.91
The objections to the treaty-makers' ability to authorize non-
U.S. decision-makers to make domestically effective law are not a
sound separation of powers argument. They seem to be even weaker
than the federalism-based objections to some treaties. To the extent
that separation of powers restrictions are designed to prevent one
domestic branch from aggrandizing itself at the expense of another,
87. David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1697, 1702
(2003).
88. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
89. Id. at 433.
90. Compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390, 392-93 (1998) (arguing that treaty power
should not be limited by subject matter due to federalism limitations but that if
a treaty encompasses subject matter beyond Congress's regulatory authority it
should not be binding on the states), with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making
and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of
the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1083-87 (2000) (asserting that
federalism should not limt treaty power at all).
91. For my analysis, see MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER 148-52 (2003).
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the difficulty cannot arise directly when the decision-making body is
not domestic. 92 To the extent that such restrictions are designed to
structure decision-making in ways that promote the long-term
interests of the people of the United States without endangering our
liberties, it is hard to understand why the people should be disabled
from concluding that our long-term interests would be better
advanced by the kinds of treaty arrangements at issue. Perhaps there
are some cognitive questions about our over-valuing short term
benefits over long term costs that might be relevant to this issue.
But, the existing literature hardly begins to frame the questions in the
right way.
Several threads run through all these areas in which objections
have been raised to making non-U.S. law a rule of decision for U.S.
law. First, the areas where problems have actually arisen are quite
few and narrow. The concerns are far more about what might
happen in the future than they are about what has already
happened.93 Second, the objections are constitutionally creative. It
is not that they are frivolous in some strong sense. Instead, they are
at odds with rather long-standing understandings of constitutional
law and working them out in detail can create some pretty peculiar
doctrinal structures. There is nothing wrong in principle with
creative arguments with such consequences, but the creativity and
92. The difficulty might arise indirectly if the Senate, by a two-thirds
majority, ratified a treaty negotiated by the President giving a non-domestic
decision-making power to create law with domestic legal effects. This would
cut the House of Representatives out of the process that makes law with
domestic effects. The scenario seems to me so unrealistic as not to warrant
developing law around. And, even here, the aggrandizement is not of the sort
the Supreme Court has worred about in the domestic context: The House may
be cut out of the law-making process, but the Senate and the President do not
get any more power over domestic law-making; rather, the international body
does.
93. An indication of this is that the literature typically includes a discussion
of the International Criminal Court. See, e.g., Young, supra note 72, at 538-
39; John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 205, 210 (2000). The United States has not ratified, and is extremely
unlikely to ratify, the treaty creating that court. Discussing the constitutional
problems that might arise if the United States did ratify it seems to me another
tempest in a teapot. There are, of course, circumstances under which the
International Criminal Court could assert jurisdiction over U.S. citizens even
though the United States is not a party to the treaty. Whether the treaty
violates domestic U.S. law has nothing to do with that problem, if it is one.
256
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the consequences ought to signal that perhaps something else is at
stake. Finally, non-U.S. institutions have not made any domestically
effective law in any area of law. Rather, U.S. courts have to decide
what constitutes customary international law, and then apply it
domestically; U.S. institutions have to decide how to respond to the
incentives created by the WTO and NAFTA institutions.
IV. REAL CONCERNS ABOUT MAKING NON-U.S. LAW A
RULE OF DECISION
I believe that underneath all the technicalities lie two concerns
that should be the focus of attention: (1) a concern that making non-
U.S. law a rule of decision would generate bad law; and (2) a
concern that doing so somehow could impair U.S. sovereignty and
the democratic self-governance of the people of the United States. In
my view, the first is a genuine concern, albeit often oversimplified,
while the second is not. The concern for sovereignty and democracy,
I believe, is a concern that federal judges will impose a particular
elite's view of good law on a public that might disagree if it
understood what was at stake.
Criticizing the Court's mention of the view of the world
community in Atkins, Justice Scalia said that that community's
"notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people." 94
What exactly is the "thankfully" doing there? Pretty clearly, I think,
Justice Scalia is alluding to the fact-as he sees it-that U.S. notions
of justice are better than those prevailing in (some) other nations.
Surely that is true, although why one should be concerned is
another question. The notions of justice prevailing in Saudi Arabia
regarding the proper roles of men and women are not worth
emulating in the United States. But, I have not run across much
scholarship advocating that the United States adopt as a
constitutional rule Saudi Arabian ideas of gender inequality. 95 The
standard image is of floors and sometimes ceilings. Advocates of
94. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002).
95. There is literature on the question of whether U.S. scholars should take
a critical stance towards the Saudi Arabian notions of gender inequality. My
sense of the literature is that proponents of a tolerant multiculturalism are in
the minority on this question, and the proponents of universal standards of
gender equality are in the majority-which makes Justice Scalia's concerns
pretty clearly misplaced on this issue at least.
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taking non-U.S. principles of justice into account begin with the
proposition that existing U.S. law sets a floor for the United States.
Where principles of justice elsewhere are lower than that floor, they
should be ignored. But, the advocates contend, U.S. decision-makers
should be willing to raise the U.S. floor-to provide more protection
for interests already recognized in U.S. law-in response to higher
standards elsewhere.
The precise scope of this advocacy is unclear. The usual
example is the death penalty, and in particular the tolerance in the
United States of administering capital punishment to people who
were juveniles when they committed their crimes.96 That practice is
denounced in every society reasonably comparable to the United
States.97 The real question is whether there is any other issue on
which U.S. principles of justice are below those accepted elsewhere.
If not, we could forego talking about principles of justice prevailing
elsewhere and discuss directly the justice of the juvenile death
penalty, with our moral or constitutional judgments informed by the
reasons offered in support of the judgments made elsewhere, but not
by the mere fact of those judgments.
As far as I can tell, the only other area in which there has been
substantial advocacy of relying on non-U.S. standards of justice
involves freedom of expression. Early defenses of hate speech
regulation pointed out that international norms not only supported
the proposition that hate speech regulations were permissible
national policies but went farther to require the adoption of hate
speech regulations as a means of combating discrimination.98 More
recently, U.S. concerns about freedom of expression produced an
international regulation of tobacco advertising that described
stringent regulations of such advertising, then relaxed those
regulations to the extent they were precluded by national
constitutional norms.99 And, it is fairly easy to locate regulations of
96. See Nora V. Demelitner, The Death Penalty in the United States:
Following the European Lead?, 81 OR. L. REv. 131, 140-41 (2002).
97. Id.
98. See Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320,2341-48 (1989).
99. For a discussion, see Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory
Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 268-86 (1996).
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commercial expression elsewhere that seem quite at odds with U.S.
understandings of free speech.100
What I find interesting about these examples-and, I stress, they
are the only ones with any traction in policy-making-is that it is
quite unclear as a matter of domestic U.S. constitutional law where
the floor is. Of course we know what the positive domestic
constitutional law is: the First Amendment places significant limits
on a government's ability to adopt hate speech regulations, 0 1 and
substantial limits on its ability to regulate tobacco advertising.
0 2
But, unlike the question of gender equality, the positive law is highly
contested within U.S. constitutional discourse. Put another way,
advocates of hate speech regulation and regulation of tobacco
advertising use arguments available within U.S. constitutional
discourse to support the conclusion that the Supreme Court has
placed the floor too high. There would be nothing regrettable, from
their point of view, in lowering the floor.
Obviously, the advocates of hate speech regulation and tobacco
advertising regulation might be wrong. My personal view, for
example, is that differences in the structure of the administration of
justice in Canada and the United States make it less dangerous for
Canada to enforce hate speech regulations than for U.S.
prosecutors. 10 3 So, whereas a lower floor is acceptable for Canada,
it is not acceptable for the United States. However, this is an
100. My favorite examples are regulations barring professionals from
"advertising" by means of allowing themselves to be the subjects of approving
stories published in ordinary newspapers. Compare B. v. Canton of Bern Law
Society (Fed. Ct. Switz., Feb. 11, 1999) (holding that the publication of an
interview-based profile of a lawyer in a newspaper can be treated as prohibited
indirect advertising), with Barthold v. Federal Republic of Germany, 90 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985) (finding that an injunction against a veterinary
physician barring him from giving interviews violated the European
Convention on Human Rights). I am quite sure that none of these regulations
would be regarded as commercial advertising (and so, on views the current
Supreme Court has rejected as too tolerant of regulation, subject to only
minimal scrutiny) under even the most generous standards in U.S. law. They
would be treated as ordinary expression by newspapers, and subjected to rather
stringent review.
101. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992).
102. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001).
103. The basic idea is that the administration of justice in Canada is
substantially more centralized than it is in the United States, making abusive
prosecutions less likely (though not impossible).
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argument framed within a discourse that takes seriously the notions
of justice that prevail elsewhere, and then asks whether there are
reasons applicable to the United States for refusing to adopt those
notions here. Or, to put the point another way, a parenthetical
"thankfully" is not a serious way of addressing the issues raised by
those who advocate taking notions of justice seriously. It is a way of
avoiding thinking about the merits of those notions and their
suitability given the specific institutions and distinctive histories of
the United States and the nations in which those notions prevail. °4
Justice Scalia "thankfully" suggests that there is some general
objection to considering notions of justice prevailing elsewhere in
interpreting the U.S. Constitution, and obscures the fact that the real
arguments should be about particular claims-such as the suitability
of other nations' notions of gender equality, capital punishment, or
free speech for the United States with its own institutions and
history.10 5 There is another set of objections to using non-U.S. law
104. The oral argument in Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003),
contained an exchange between Justice Ginsburg and Solicitor General Olson
in which the Solicitor General addressed the questions in the right way,
alluding to differences between the United States and other nations that reduce
the relevance of those other nations' experience with affirmative action, rather
than dismissing the reference to other nations' experience entirely:
QUESTION (Justice Ginsburg): General-we're part of a world, and
this problem is a global problem. Other countries operating under the
same equality norm have confronted it. Our neighbor to the north,
Canada, has, the European Union, South Africa, and they have all
approved this kind of, they call it positive discrimination. Do we-
they have rejected what you recited as the ills that follow from this.
Should we shut that from our view at all or should we consider what
judges in other places have said on this subject?
GENERAL OLSON: I submit, Justice Ginsburg that none of those
countries has our history, none of those countries has the Fourteenth
Amendment, none of those histories has the history of the statements
by this Court which has examined the question over and over again
that the ultimate damage that is done by racial preferences is such that
if there ever is a situation in which such factors must be used that they
must be-race neutral means must be used to accomplish those
objective, narrow tailoring must be applied, and this-this-these
programs fail all of those tests.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 02-516), 2003 U.S.
Trans LEXIS 27, at *23 (April 1, 2003).
105. For a similar observation, see Neuman, supra note 6, at 1899 ("[T]o the
extent that constitutional adjudication in the United States has any
suprapositive component, and does not consist simply in replicating
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as a rule of decision that similarly offers a general objection to
obscure the real issue. These are objections that making non-U.S.
law a rule of decision surrenders U.S. sovereignty to non-U.S.
decision-makers who are not responsive to control by the people of
the United States.
The term "sovereignty" recurs in criticisms of the use of non-
U.S. law as a rule of decision for U.S. problems. 10 6 The language of
sovereignty is misleading in two ways. First, it overlooks the fact
that a sovereign nation can decide that its sovereign interests are
advanced overall by making agreements with other nations that limit
what it can otherwise do. Consider again the Vienna Convention's
requirement that a nation's citizens arrested abroad be advised of
their right to confer with a consular official. The Convention's
signatories surrendered some of their domestic sovereignty because
they believed that their citizens will benefit from the availability of
consular advice when they are arrested abroad.10 7 Even more, a
sovereign nation can decide that its sovereign interests are advanced
overall by agreeing with other nations to delegate interpretive
authority over treaties to some supranational body. Again, the
Vienna Convention provides an example. As with all legal texts, the
Convention's terms are not self-defining. Nations might believe it
desirable to create a system of consular notification, but be unable to
agree on some important details, such as the remedy for failing to
inform arrested non-nationals of their rights under the Convention.
Given the choice between no agreement at all and an agreement with
the basics specified and details left to be filled in by some
governmental usages of the eighteenth century, the normative arguments of
international human rights tribunals are at least potentially relevant. Such
arguments should be examined with care and discernment, and they should not
be dismissed categorically.").
106. Probably the most notable example is RABKIN, supra note 27. Rabkin
concludes that "America's first duty must be to protect its own democracy and
the rights and resources of its own people-by safeguarding its own
sovereignty." Id. at 101. See also Bolton, supra note 89, at 221 (asserting that
the costs of global governance to the United States include "impaired popular
sovereignty"). For another example, by a more careful scholar, see Young,
supra note 72, at 542-43 (discussing "[t]he [a]biding [i]mportance of
[s]overeignty").
107. Cf RABKiN, supra note 27, at 2 (noting the tension between the
definition of "sovereignty" as independence and the fact that sovereign nations
"undertake treaty commitments").
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supranational interpreter, a sovereign nation might conclude that the
second choice better advances its sovereign interests. 10 8 In general,
the mere fact that some non-U.S. body determines the meaning of the
law applicable within the United States does not itself show that the
United States' sovereignty has been reduced.
Second, and I think more important, the language of sovereignty
obscures the fact that it is always a domestic decision-maker who
concludes that a non-U.S. rule should be a rule of decision within the
United States. After all, who decides that a defendant in an ATCA
case has violated a norm of customary international law? Not a law
professor, and not foreign nations whose practices are taken as
evidence of what the norm is, but a U.S. federal court. A U.S. court
has to decide that the International Court of Justice's interpretation of
the Vienna Convention should be followed. Alternatively, if it is
suggested that the Constitution takes the choice out of the court's
hands by saying that treaties are the law of the land, the U.S. treaty-
makers have to have decided to sign the Vienna Convention, to
accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in general
and as an interpreter of the Vienna Convention, and so on down to
the bottom. In brief, whenever a U.S. decision-maker invokes a non-
U.S. rule of decision, the decision is as fully domestic as any other
decision the decision-maker makes. There is, as far as I can tell, no
surrender of sovereignty whatsoever.
This second argument is also a response to the somewhat more
coherent objection to the use of non-U.S. rules of decision in U.S.
cases, that doing so somehow undermines domestic democracy, the
ability of the people of the United States to set the rules by which we
are governed. So, for example, Ernest Young argues that
"supranational lawmaking... risks undermining our Constitution's
institutional strategy" because it "operates outside those systems of
108. Stephen Krasner makes this point, in connection with the WTO: The
"United States would not have secured the agreement of other countries on a
wide range of issues... if it had not tied its own hands and constrained its own
freedom of action. The dispute settlement mechanism provides a way of
clearly identifying what constitutes reneging. ... Other countries might have
been very, very leery about entering into arrangements in which they would
have remained vulnerable to unilateral action by the US that could not clearly
be marked as violating the agreement." Stephen D. Krasner, Power and
Constraint, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231,234 (2000).
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checks and balances and accountability."'10 9  In one sense that
formulation is-by definition-accurate: Supranational lawmaking
institutions necessarily operate outside the domestic system of
checks and balances; that is why we call them supranational. But in
another sense, Young's formulation is misleading. The rules made
by supranational institutions become domestic U.S. law only through
the operation of U.S. domestic institutions subject to the checks-and-
balances system. The International Court of Justice's interpretation
of the Vienna Convention is domestically effective, if at all, only
because domestic courts make it so, or (on another view) because the
domestic treaty-makers, themselves subject to the checks-and-
balances system, have made it so.
This point is so obvious that I find it hard to believe that the
opponents of so-called global governance have overlooked it. And,
indeed, at some places it becomes pretty clear that they have not.
Take John Bolton's formulation: at one point he expresses concern
that the "Globalists," as he calls them, have a strategy of "creat[ing]
a network of international agreements and customary international
law that effectively take[s] critical political and legal decisions out of
the hands of nation-states by operationally overriding their own
internal decision-making processes." 1 0  Putting aside for the
moment the question of customary international law,"' I think the
problem with this formulation is transparent: The international
obligations the "Globalists" want to create would be created by
means of domestic decision-making processes, not by by-passing
them. 1 2 Two sentences later, though, Bolton makes what he thinks
is the same point, but it is not. He writes that accepting the
"Globalists' claims would "judicialize key decisions, thus removing
them from [our] common political processes, and, in effect to
supersede national constitutional standards with international
109. Young, supra note 72, at 529.
110. Bolton, supra note 89, at 212.
111. See discussion infra note 113.
112. One might take Bolton to be arguing that the scope of the treaty power
ought to be limited so that the domestic decision-making process could not
reach the "Globalists' ends. However, that does not seem to be his argument,
and, as I have indicated, the argument itself raises quite difficult questions
about distinguishing between the constraints on democratic governance
imposed by constitutions and the constraints imposed by treaties made
pursuant to broad constitutional treaty-making powers.
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ones."11 3  Here, the objection is to decision-making, not by
institutions entirely outside the domestic arena, but by domestic
courts. 
114
At this point, though, the argument becomes a familiar-and
rather tired--challenge to so-called judicial activism, and not even in
a constitutional context but essentially a statutory one. I find it
impossible to distinguish, in terms of democratic legitimacy, between
a domestic court filling in the gaps of a statutory scheme and the
same court determining what customary international law is and
applying it, or interpreting a treaty to require the domestic courts to
take as rules of decisions the statements made by supranational
institutions. 115
Now, it may be true that judges who pay attention to non-U.S.
decision-makers may interpret treaty obligations differently, or
interpret the scope of constitutional limitations on the treaty power
differently, from judges who do not. The real argument, though,
should be about the interpretive principles judges should use, which
is the argument in the purely domestic context. The fact that the
relevant texts are treaties and statutes having some international
character should not change the nature of the discussion.
By noting two other themes in the critical literature, we can
refine our understanding of the positions taken by critics of the
possibility that U.S. courts might choose to take non-U.S. rules of
law as rules of decision. The first theme is criticism of the role
transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play in the
processes of concern to the critics; the second is concern about the
113. Bolton, supra note 89, at 212. The question of customary international
law is answered by observing once again that domestic courts determine the
content of customary international law in the cases they decide pursuant to
some authorization by domestic legislative bodies.
114. Robert Bork's attack on what he calls the emerging trend toward an
"international constitutional common law" also focuses on the displacement of
legislative bodies by courts. ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE
WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (2003). Note the subtitle.
115. Young, supra note 72, at 534, asserts that giving customary
international law direct effect in U.S. courts "shifts... authority to courts,
which exercise a great deal of discretion in interpreting the vague materials on
which customary norms rest." I wonder whether this distinguishes the
authority of courts in this setting from their authority in ordinary statutory
interpretation.
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asserted cosmopolitanism of the subset of judges who do take non-
U.S. law seriously.
Bolton includes a section on "NGOs on Parade"' 6 in his
critique, and refers disparagingly to "members of self-styled human
rights, environmental and humanitarian groups."' 17 No doubt NGOs
play a role in the processes Bolton dislikes. My difficulty is figuring
out why that role is different from that played by an ideologically
oriented interest group like the NAACP on the liberal side and the
Center for Individual Rights on the conservative side. Such groups
articulate norms they believe are currently part of domestic U.S. law
and seek to establish their claims through litigation and pressure on
elected officials." 8  Transnational NGOs seem to be exactly the
same. In Stephen Krasner's terms, they take advantage of the
"permeability of the American political process," ' 19 and its openness
to pressure from anywhere-transnational NGOs with some
members in the United States, transnational corporations with some
investors in the United States-to advance their interests. 1
20
It seems that the argument against global governance and the
"Globalists" reduces to dislike for the role liberal interest groups play
in domestic U.S. litigation. This is coupled with a concern that
somehow these interest groups will be more effective when they
claim, for example, that some international document requires that
U.S. courts follow their favored view of equality than when they
claim that the Equal Protection Clause, properly interpreted,
116. Bolton, supra note 89, at 215 ("NGOs on Parade").
117. Id. at 205. See also RABKiN, supra note 27, at 41-42 (discussing "NGO
Activism").
118. See generally NAACP @ Work, at http://www.naacp.org-
work/index.html (2003) (explaining the primary focus of the NAACP);
Fighting for Individual Rights, at http://www.cir-usa.org/
missionnew.html (last revised Jan. 17, 2002) (explaining the mission of the
organization).
119. Krasner, supra note 104, at 231. See also Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-
hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in
Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1921, 1926-27 (2003) (referring
to "the very permeability of our legal system" and concluding that "U.S.
law... cannot be secured against external forces.").
120. See Krasner, supra note 104, at 236 ("It is not clear that there is any
practical way to limit the activities of [transnational] NGOs, to distinguish
them, for instance, from the lobbying efforts of multinational corporations
including foreign corporations with subsidiaries in the United States.").
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embraces their favored view.12 1 Why should that be so? Here the
critics' concern about cosmopolitanism comes into play. Bork refers
to a "cultural socialism" among these judges who, he argues, "piece
together, case by case, a fabric of law" that reflects the values of
cosmopolitan elites.' 22  Bolton refers to "a diverse collection of
people generally uneasy with the dominance of capitalism as an
economic philosophy and individualism as a political philosophy."'
1 23
This simply transfers the authors' conservative anti-elitism from
domestic subject matters to the ones at issue here.' 24 How, if at all,
does the global context alter the discussion?
Anne-Marie Slaughter's work on the rise of transnational
networks of judges may provide the answer. 25 Slaughter observes
that from the 1980s on, judges from the constitutional courts of
various nations began to attend conferences with each other,
exchanging views about what their nations' constitutions said, about
how they were interpreting similar clauses, and about what
constitutionalism meant. 126 The crass materialist in me comes up
with an explanation for why conservatives might be concerned about
U.S. judges referring to international documents in interpreting the
U.S. Constitution. Judges who do so are more likely than judges
who do not to be invited to these conferences, which are sometimes
held in attractive venues. 1
27
121. See id.
122. BORK, supra note 110.
123. Bolton, supra note 89, at 205.
124. Bork's rhetoric in his recent book on "[t]he [w]orldwide [r]ule of
[j]udges," is indistinguishable from his rhetoric in his earlier works on
domestic U.S. constitutional law. Compare BORK, supra note 110, with e.g.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW, (Touchstone 1991) (1989) (discussing the propriety and necessity of
interpreting the Constitution according to the Framers' original intent).
125. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103,
1120-23 (2000).
126. See id.
127. Cf Young, supra note 72, at 527 (observing that "you tend to get
invited on better trips if you do comparative or international law."). Young's
observation is consistent with comments one hears in conversations among law
professors about the burgeoning interest in transnational law. It may not be
entirely accurate. In 2003 the trips I took arising out of my comparative work
were to Innsbruck, Austria, Dublin, Ireland, Wellington, New Zealand,
London, Ontario, and the Faroe Islands-at best a mixed bag, with enough
266
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Yet even this mechanism seems to be of limited force.1
28
Conference conveners always like to have one or two dissenters from
the agenda they want to advance. A judge who wanted to be invited
to these conferences could make a name for himself or herself by
articulately presenting the case against using non-U.S. law in U.S.
decisions, and then wait for the invitations. 1
29
In sum, as a domestic constitutional lawyer, I believe the
arguments presented against making non-U.S. law a rule of decision
in U.S. cases are no more than replays of arguments about statutory
and constitutional interpretation in the purely domestic context. The
transnational context has not-yet-added anything to the familiar
arguments, except perhaps an unduly heightened rhetoric that seems
strikingly out of proportion to what has actually happened on the
ground.
130
time in airplanes and at airports to reduce significantly the "fun" aspects of the
time (often relatively short) on the ground.
128. Elsewhere Slaughter points out that similar networks are developing
among executive officials. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Building Global
Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 227-28 (2000). The democracy-based
objections to the phenomena at issue would, I think, disappear completely if
domestic law-making were to come under the influence of legislators who
participate in such networks, as Slaughter suggests should happen soon. Id.
129. I suppose that the conservative critics might be concerned about a
subtle psychological effect even on these dissenting judges. If they hang out
with judges who do refer to international sources long enough, they may be
seduced into abandoning their principled objections to the practice. I, myself,
doubt the force of this mechanism too. Federal judges are strong-minded
people in general, and know how to evaluate on the merits reasons for the
positions presented to them, discounting for their friendship with the people
who present the positions.
130. One sometimes hears claims that invoking transnational law
exacerbates the so-called democratic deficit associated with the institutions
that develop transnational law. But, precisely because domestic courts invoke
transnational law, doing so reproduces-but does not, I believe---exacerbate
the democratic deficit associated with domestic courts. David Fontana
provided a useful example in his comments on a draft of this Essay. Fontana
suggests that a New Yorker might have problems with someone from
Connecticut telling him or her what to do, but would have more difficulty with
someone from Alabama doing so, and even more difficulty with someone from
Chile doing so. Yet, New Yorkers do accept rules imposed by people from
Alabama (Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black) or Arizona (Justice Sandra Day
O'Conner). Further, New Yorkers would be subject to rules articulated by
someone from Chile only if some domestic decision-maker placed those rules
in domestic law. E-mail from David Fontana, PhD student at Yale Law School,
to Mark Tushnet (Sept. 9, 2003, 09:13:33, EST) (on file with author).
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V. CONCLUSION
The critical literature on the role of non-U.S. law in U.S. courts
is filled with a striking trope, taking advocacy as law-making.
Ernest Young provides a typical example, writing, "[t]o suggest that
supranational rules should trump state sovereign immunity when a
federal treaty is being enforced is to rather profoundly alter the
constitutional constraints on enforcement of federal law."'' Not
quite. To suggest that the law be interpreted in a particular way is,
well, to suggest that it be interpreted in a particular way. It is most
definitely not to alter the law. The law would be altered if domestic
decision-makers, cognizant of constitutional constraints and subject
to domestic political ones, concluded that the law, taken as a whole,
is best interpreted to incorporate non-U.S. law as a rule of decision.
The alteration, that is, comes about through the operation of entirely
ordinary law-making processes on the domestic scene.
John Bolton's catalogue of his adversaries includes "academics
(largely, but not exclusively, law and international relations
professors) and media professionals; members of self-styled human
rights, environmental and humanitarian groups; [and] rarified circles
within the 'permanent government,' and at present [in 2000] even in
the White House."' 132 This invites the obvious tu quoque response.
When he wrote, Bolton was a senior executive at the American
Enterprise Institute, which one might call a "self-styled" public
policy group, and in 2003 Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security ("even in the White House," or close
enough). The scholarly critics, who provide better arguments than
Bolton for the positions he takes, are academics, and the ones whose
work with which I am familiar are largely law professors.
What seems to be happening is that interest groups dress up
ordinary interest-group politics in the United States with arguments
that their favored positions are required by the Constitution or, in this
131. Young, supra note 72, at 541.
132. Bolton, supra note 89, at 205.
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instance, by supranational law. 133  The space-aliens' arguments,
when translated, turn out to be nothing new.
133. For an argument generally compatible with the one made here, see Peter
J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False
Prophets, 79 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Nov.-Dec. 2000 at 9-10 (arguing both that
"New Sovereigntism," anti-internationalism is based on flawed premises, and
that it risks "America's future global involvement" and "position of
international leadership.")
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